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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This case involves a claim of medical malpractice. Appellant John E. Wyman had a sore 
on his left heel for which he made an appointment to see Defendant Dr. John Eck at Lifetime 
Health, LLC (hereinafter "Lifetime"). Dr. Eck's physician's assistant, Julie Scott, saw Mr. 
Wyman on two occasions. First, on December 22, 2011. The second visit was on April 19, 
2012. In both visits, Defendant Scott diagnosed a wart and treated the condition as a wart. In 
August 2012, Plaintiff John Wyman was seen by a friend, Kathy Alkire, a nurse practitioner, 
who recommended that he see a dermatologist. The dermatologist, Dr. Jared Scott, performed a 
shave biopsy, the tissue from which was sent to the University of Colorado Dermatology 
Consultants for analysis. On September 9, 2012, Dr. Lori Prok from the University of Colorado 
diagnosed an ulcerated nodular malignant melanoma. (R. p. 134). 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
On or about April 2, 2015, the District Court denied Defendants' first motion for 
summary judgment wherein Defendants asserted Plaintiffs' failed to timely file their claim for 
medical malpractice within two years as required by Idaho Code §5-219. (R. pp. 101-111.) 
Defendants did not produce un-contradicted medical evidence that Mr. Wyman's cancer was 
capable of being ascertained prior to his filing his malpractice action, and therefore the court 
denied the motion. (Id.) 
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Defendants filed a renewed motion for summary judgment wherein an affidavit from Dr. 
Gregory Wells asserted that Mr. Wyman's cancer was ascertainable at the latest on April 19, 
2012. (R. pp. 112-121.) After a hearing held on September 25, 2015, where after, the District 
Court ruled that Plaintiffs failed to file their medical malpractice claim within two years as 
required by Idaho Code §5-219. (R. pp. 227-232.) 
Plaintiffs' filed a timely Notice of Appeal seeking reversal of the trial court's granting of 
summary judgement. (R. pp. 233-237.) Plaintiffs then filed an Amended Notice of Appeal (R. 
pp. 238-242.) 
Ill. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. John Wyman was seen by Defendant Scott at Lifetime Health on or about 
December 22, 2011 with a sore on his left foot. (R. pp. 17, 7 4-75.) Defendant Scott diagnosed a 
wart and prescribed antibiotic ointment. (R. pp. 17, 75.) 
2. John Wyman saw Defendant Scott a second time on April 19, 2012. (R. pp. 18, 
75.) Defendant Scott froze off the presumed wart from Mr. Wyman's left heel. (R. pp. 18, 75.) 
3. On or about August 25, 2012, Mr. Wyman's heel was looked at by a family 
friend, nurse practitioner, Kathy Alkire R. pp. 18, 75.) Ms. Alkire recommended that Mr. 
Wyman see a dermatologist. (R. pp. 19, 75.) 
4. On August 31, 2012, Mr. Wyman was seen by Dr. Jared Scott, who performed a 
shave biopsy. (R. p. 19, 75). The tissue was sent to the University of Colorado Dermatology 
Consultants for analysis. (R. pp. 19, 75.) The results came back as malignant melanoma. (R. 
pp. 134-135). 
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5. Mr. Wyman underwent surgery for removal of the malignancy on or about 
September 25, 2012. (R. pp. 19, 76). 
6. On or about November 29, 2012, Mr. Wyman was seen by oncologist Hung 
Khong, M.D. who staged Mr. Wyman's cancer as a Stage IIIC. (R. p. 20, 152, 170.) 
7. Plaintiffs John Wyman filed his Application and Claim for Medical Malpractice 
on August 28, 2014 ( R. p. 43.) 
8. Dr. Hung Khong was deposed on or about June 5, 2015 (R. pp. 164-208.) 
9. Dr. Khong is board certified in internal medicine and oncology and is an associate 
professor at the Huntsman Cancer Institute, University of Utah who specializes in the treatment 
of breast cancer and melanoma. (R. pp. 169 lines 3-16, 170 lines 24-25, 171 lines 1-6.) 
10. Dr. Khong testified regarding his treatment of Mr. Wyman and regarding when 
his cancer was capable of diagnosis. (R. pp. 195-196). Dr. Khong testified: 
Q: ... First and most simple is, you agree, don't you , Doctor, that the only way 
you can actually diagnose malignant melanoma is through biopsy; correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Looking at it isn't going to give you a diagnosis, correct? 
A: Correct. 
Q: Even if you looked at it when there was just a lesion before it was 
biopsied, you couldn't tell if that lesion was dangerous or deadly, could you? 
A: I don't know. I don't know. 
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Q: It would be speculating to try to decide: correct? 
A: Correct. 
(R. pp. 195 lines 20-25, 196 lines 1-2, 197 lines 13-19.) 
11. Dr. Khong testified that no one could know that cancer was existed at Mr. 
Wyman's appointment in April 2012 without a biopsy. (R p. 182 lines 7-25). 
12. Dr. Khong testified that no one could tell whether cancer existed or was causing 
harm to Mr. Wyman as of his visit with Defendant Scott in April 2012. (R. p. 198 13-17.) 
13. Dr. Khong testified that no one could tell how long it takes cancer to form. (R. 
p.183 lines 9-17.) 
14. Dr. Khong testified that no one could tell how long cancer could go untreated 
without causing damage. (R. pp. 203 lines 16-25, 204, 205 lines 1-8.) 
15. Dr. Gregory Wells testified via affidavit that Mr. Wyman's cancer was 
objectively ascertainable and capable of being diagnosed when it first became symptomatic for 
the patient (R. p. 118 paragraph 5.) 
16. Dr. Wells testified that Mr. Wyman's type of cancer is often misdiagnosed at 
presentation and people often undergo other treatments because they are misdiagnosed. (R. p, 
119 Paragraph 7.) 
17. Dr. Wells testified that "once biopsied, they are objectively capable of being 
diagnosed when they first become symptomatic." (R. pp. 119-120 paragraph 7.) 
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18. Dr. Wells testified that he would have recommended a biopsy which would have 
been both medically necessary and justified in a follow-up visit after Defendant Scott performed 
cryotherapy. (R. 119 paragraph 6.) 
19. The district court at the September 25, 2015 hearing, the court stated it was not 
weighing the evidence but that it did not believe Dr. Khong's testimony establishes any expertise 
that he had opinions such as "nobody can determine that" and it would therefore not give such 
opinions weight. (September 25, 2015 Hearing Tr. V. 1 p. 44.) 
20. The court stated that "based upon the affidavit of Dr. Wells, the deposition 
testimony of Dr. Kong (sic), I do not believe reasonable minds could reach different conclusions 
on the evidence presented." (September 25, 2015 Hearing Tr. V. 1 p. 44.) 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE #1: Whether the district court erred when it granted summary judgment to 
Defendants when Dr. Khong's testimony contradicted Dr. Well's affidavit regarding when Mr. 
Wyman's cancer was objectively ascertainable and causing harm? 
ISSUE #2: Whether the district court erred when it weighed the evidence presented by 
Plaintiffs through Dr. Khong's testimony and thereby ruling that it would give Dr. Khong's 
opinions no weight? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1 
"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court utilizes the 
same standard of review used by the district court originally ruling on the motion." Arregui v. 
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Gallegos-Main, 153 Idaho 801,804,291 P.3d 1000, 1003 (2012). Summary judgment is proper 
"if the pleadings, depositions and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show 
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 
judgment as a matter oflaw." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When considering whether the evidence in the 
record shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, the trial court must liberally construe 
the facts, and draw all reasonable inferences, in favor of the nonmoving party." ." Conner v. 
Hodges, 333 P.3d 130; 2014 Ida. LEXIS 230 (Idaho 2014) citing to Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus 
Reg'/ Med Ctr., 137 Idaho 160, 163, 45 P.3d 816,819 (2002). As a result, the summary 
judgment procedure may not be invoked where there is bona fide factual dispute between the 
parties. See Gauck v. Meleski, 346 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1965). Summary judgment is therefore 
inappropriate if reasonable minds could differ as to import of the evidence. See Peoples Mortg. 
Co., Inc. v. Federal Nat. Mortg. Ass'n, 856 F.Supp. 910 (E.D.Pa. 1994). 
ISSUE #2 
The admissibility of evidence contained in affidavits and depositions in support of or in 
opposition to a motion for summary judgment is a threshold matter to be addressed by the court 
before applying the liberal construction and reasonable inferences rule to determine whether the 
evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact for trial. This Court applies an abuse of 
discretion standard when reviewing a trial court's determination of the admissibility of testimony 
offered in connection with a motion for summary judgment. Gerdon v. Rydalch, 153 Idaho 237, 
241,280 P.3d 740, 744 (2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
DEFENDANTS WHEN DR. KHONG'S TESTIMONY CONTRADICTED DR. WELL'S 
AFFIDAVIT REGARDING WHEN MR. WYMAN'S CANCER WAS OBJECTIVELY 
ASCERTAINABLE AND CAUSING HARM. 
The district court erred when it held that Mr. Wyman's cancer was objectively 
ascertainable and causing him harm more than two years prior to his filing his Application and 
Claim for Medical Malpractice Prelitigation Hearing (hereafter "Application".) The District 
court, in granting Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, relied on the affidavit 
from Dr. Gregory Wells to rule that there was un-contradicted medical evidence that Mr. 
Wyman's cancer was objectively ascertainable and causing him harm more than two years 
before he filed his Application. Dr. Wells asserted that, although you could not diagnose 
melanoma without a biopsy, that once biopsied, that the evidence was clear that Mr. Wyman had 
been suffering from melanoma and was being harmed from the cancer from the time he became 
symptomatic in 2011. (R. pp. 119-120 paragraph 7.) The testimony of Dr. Hung Khong, Mr. 
Wyman's oncologist, directly contradicted Dr. Wells' opinion regarding whether and when Mr. 
Wyman's cancer was objectively ascertainable and causing him damage at the time defendants 
treated him. (R. pp. 182 lines 7-25, 183 lines 9-17, 195 lines 20-25, 196 lines 1-2, 198 lines 13-
17, 203 lines 16-25, 204 and 205 lines 1-8.) 
The statute of limitations is an affirmative defense which must be proved by the 
defendant. Resource Engineering, Inc. v. Siler, 94 Idaho 935,500 P.2d 836 (1972). The 
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defendant has the burden of proving every element necessary to establish the affirmative defense. 
Johnston v. Keefer, 48 Idaho 42,280 P. 324 (1929). 
In order to succeed on their claim that the statute of limitations bars Plaintiffs claims, 
Defendants had the burden of proving with un-contradicted medical evidence that John Wyman's 
malignant melanoma was objectively ascertainable at the time Defendants provided him medical 
care on either December 22, 2011 or April 19, 2012, or that he had suffered damage at either of 
those times. Davis v. Moran, 112 Idaho 703, 709, 735 P.2d 1014, 1020 (Idaho 1987). The 
"objectively ascertainable" standard was defined in Davis v. Moran as "[b ]y this, we mean that 
objective medical proof would support the existence of an actual injury." 112 Idaho at 709, 735 
P.2d at 1020. 
This Court has repeatedly held that "a cause of action does not accrue at the time of the 
act complained of unless some damage has occurred." Hawley v. Green, 117 Idaho 498,501, 
788 P.2d 1321, 1325 (1990) citing to Griggs v. Nash, 116 Idaho 228, 775 P.2d 120 (1989); 
Werner v. American-Edwards Laboratories, 113 Idaho 434, 745 P.2d 1055 (1987); Streib v. 
Veigel, 109 Idaho 174, 706 P.2d 63 (1985); Theriault v. A.H Robins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 698 
P.2d 365 (1985); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315 (1984); and Stephens v. Stearns, 
106 Idaho 249, 678 P.2d 41 (1984). "A literal application of the language of the 1971 
amendment would lead to absurd results." Davis at 710, 1021. See also Corbridge v. Clark 
Equipment, 112 Idaho 85, 88, 730 P.2d 1005, 1008 (1986) (The sale of an allegedly mislabeled 
product which causes a personal injury more than two years after the sale takes place, "We have 
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never held that a statute of limitations may run before an aggrieved party suffers damages.") 
Citations omitted 
In Hawley, the plaintiff, over a several year period from 1979 to 1983, underwent a 
number of X-rays and CT Scans which would have revealed the existence of a tumor in her neck 
and chest. Hawley at 499, 1322. Hawley claimed that the doctors had failed to diagnose her 
tumor even though it was visible on the prior diagnostic tests. Id. at 500, 1323. Defendants 
moved for summary judgment contending that the statute of limitations had run because the 
evidence that a tumor existed on the diagnostic films could be seen in the scans from 1979 to 
1983. The Supreme Court overturned the District Court's grant of summary judgment holding 
that the defendants had the burden of coming forward with un-contradicted evidence showing 
that the tumor was progressive or otherwise dangerous to the health of the plaintiff in order to 
establish that the plaintiff had incurred "some damage" at that time." Id at 504, 1327. Citations 
omitted. 
Recently this Court, in Conner v. Hodges, 333 P.3d at 132, reviewed a summary 
judgment dismissal based on Plaintiffs missing the statute of limitations under LC. 5-219(4). In 
Conner, a claim was brought against Dr. Bryan Hodges for negligent performance of a tubal 
ligation. Id. After not wanting additional children, Plaintiff underwent a tubal ligation on 
January 31, 2007. Id. In June 2009, she found out she was pregnant. Id. She and her husband 
filed a claim for malpractice in April 2011. Id. The Defendant doctor moved for summary 
judgment asserting that the Plaintiffs missed the two year statute of limitations as the damages 
suffered by Plaintiff were objectively ascertainable in January of 2007, the date of the original 
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tubal ligation. Id at 133. The court granted Defendants motion relying on Stuard v. Jorgenson, 
150 Idaho 701,249 P.3d 156 (2011), that it was undisputed that certain tests could have been 
done which would have shown that one of Plaintiffs fallopian tubes had not been successfully 
ligated, and therefore she had suffered an injury at the time of the negligent care. Id at 134. 
Plaintiffs disputed she had suffered an injury until she got pregnant. The Court, distinguished 
Stuard because the evidence brought forth by Plaintiffs' expert was that the tests were not 
medically necessary and therefore, "[i]f no physician would perform such procedures, then the 
injury was not capable of being objectively ascertainable." Id. at 135. 
Dr. Wells is Defendants' sole source of evidence regarding whether Mr. Wyman's cancer 
was objectively ascertainable more than two years prior to Mr. Wyman filing his Application. 
Although Defendants provided the court evidence which purports to show that Mr. Wyman's 
cancer was ascertainable prior to even his seeing Defendants for treatment of his heal lesion, 
these statements (which contain factual errors and also have statements regarding the filing of 
documents and their legal effect on this matter) are contradicted by the sworn testimony of Mr. 
Wyman's oncologist Dr. Hung T. Khong, from the Huntsman Center Institute at the University 
of Utah. Dr. Khong testified that without a biopsy there could be no diagnosis of malignant 
melanoma. (R. pp. 182, lines 7-25, 195 lines 20-25, 196 lines 1-2, 197 lines 13-19.) Dr. Khong 
testified that no one could determine when Mr. Wyman's cancer became harmful. (R. pp. 203 
lines 16-25, 204, 205 lines 1-8.) Dr. Khong testified that no one could objectively determine 
whether Mr. Wyman had cancer in April of 2012, when he last saw defendant Scott. (R. 198 13-
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17.) Dr. Khong testified that you could not determine when a cancer formed or whether and 
when it was causing harm. (R. pp. 183 lines 9-17, 203 lines 16-25, 204,205 lines 1-8.) 
The Court's reasoning in Conner v. Hodges should be applied here in reversing the 
district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs claims. Here, the evidence is that, without a biopsy, there 
can be no diagnosis of cancer. No biopsy was performed until August 31, 2012, therefore there 
can be no proof that Mr. Wyman had suffered harm prior to that date. This opinion is shared by 
both Dr. Khong and Dr. Wells (R. pp. 119, 120 paragraph 7, 195 lines 20-25, 196 lines 1-2, 197 
lines 13-19). Even if it is undisputed that a biopsy could be performed, as could the tests 
proposed by the Defendant's expert in Conner, the facts show that even Dr. Wells would not 
have performed a biopsy at the time Mr. Wyman was last seen by Defendant Scott in April of 
2012. Moreover, Dr. Wells' own opinion requires that, in order to say Mr. Wyman's cancer was 
objectively ascertainable prior to his filing his Application, that "once biopsied, they ( cancer) are 
objectively capable of being diagnosed when they first become symptomatic." (R. pp. 119, 120 
paragraph 7.) The only means to say Mr. Wyman's cancer was objectively ascertainable is with 
hindsight that follows the biopsy. As testified to by Dr. Khong, there is no way to determine 
when a cancer starts or causes harm, and nothing can be determined without the benefit of 
biopsy. (R. pp. 182 lines 7-25, 183 lines 9-17, 195 lines 20-25, 196 lines 1-2, 198 lines 13-17, 
203 lines 16-25, 204 and 205 lines 1-8.) IfDr. Wells' opinion were taken to its ultimate end, 
there could be no claim in Idaho for failing to diagnose cancer because, according to him, once 
you have the benefit of a biopsy which shows cancer, then you can go back to any point in time 
where symptoms of any nature existed to prove the onset of cancer and assert harm has been 
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caused. Such a result which allows Defendants to shield itself from responsibility through the 
benefit hind sight is an absurd one to which this Court should not prescribe. 
When viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, there is clearly a dispute raised by 
Dr. Khong's testimony that is directly contradictory to the affidavit of Dr. Wells. The defendants 
have the burden of coming forward with un-contradicted evidence that the cancer was 
progressive or otherwise dangerous to him when Defendant Scott treated him in December 2011 
and again in April 2012. Defendants have not met their burden and therefore, the district court 
erred in granting Defendants' motion for summary judgment and the case should be reversed and 
remanded for further discovery and trial. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT WEIGHED THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY 
PLAINTIFFS THROUGH DR. KHONG'S TESTIMONY AND THEREBY RULING THAT IT 
WOULD GIVE DR. KHONG'S OPINIONS NO WEIGHT. 
The rules which apply to a court's determination of summary judgment are that: 
[A]ll disputed facts are liberally construed in favor of the non-moving party. The 
burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all times upon the moving 
party. This burden is onerous because even "[c]ircumstantial evidence can create 
a genuine issue of material fact." Moreover, all reasonable inferences which can 
be made from the record shall be made in favor of the party resisting the motion. 
If the record contains conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds might 
reach different conclusions, a summary judgment must be denied because all 
doubts are to be resolved against the moving party. The requirement that all 
reasonable inferences be construed in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party is a strict one. Nevertheless, when a party moves for summary judgment the 
opposing party's case must not rest on mere speculation because a mere scintilla 
of evidence is not enough to create a genuine issue of fact. Notwithstanding the 
utility of a summary judgment, a motion for summary judgment should be granted 
with caution. 
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Nield v. Pocatello Health Services, Inc., 156 Idaho 802, 845, 332 P.3d 714, 757 (Idaho 2014) 
citing to McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769-70, 820 P.2d 360, 364-65 (1991).[Intemal 
citations omitted][Emphasis added]. 
Further: 
It is well-established that on summary judgment, a trial court is not allowed to 
weigh the evidence and resolve all doubts against the movant: The trial court, 
when confronted by a motion for summary judgment, must determine if there are 
factual issues which should be resolved by the trier of facts. On such a motion it is 
not the function of the trial court to weigh the evidence or to determine those 
issues. Moreover, all doubts must be resolved against the party moving for a 
summary judgment. 
Merrill v. Duffy Reed Constr. Co., 82 Idaho 410,414,353 P.2d 657,659 (1960)[Emphasis 
added]. See also, American Land Title Co. v. Isaak, 105 Idaho 600, 601, 671 P.2d 1063, 1064 
(1983) ("Atrial court, in ruling on a motion for summary judgment, is not to weigh evidence or 
resolve controverted factual issues."); Idaho State University v. Mitchell, 97 Idaho 724, 730, 552 
P.2d 776, 782 (1976)( citing, Merrill, supra); Meyers v. Lou, 133 Idaho 846, 849, 993 P.2d 609, 
612 (2000)(" The district court may not weigh the evidence to resolve controverted factual 
issues.")). 
During the district court's oral ruling following the September 25, 2015 hearing on 
Defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment, the court made specific reference to not 
weighing the evidence in making his decision. (September 25, 2015 Hearing Tr. Vl. 44.) 
Nevertheless, the court, without expressing a ruling as to the admissibility of Dr. Khong's 
testimony stated "I just don't believe that Dr. Kong's(sic) affidavit (deposition testimony) 
establishes any expertise that he had opinions such as "nobody can determine that" and I'm 
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giving those such opinions no weight." 1 This statement shows that the court did just what it said 
it was not doing, weighing the evidence. Moreover, the court went on to state "based upon the 
affidavit of Dr. Wells, the deposition testimony of Dr. Kong (sic) I do not believe reasonable 
minds could reach different conclusions on the evidence presented, so I find that there is no 
genuine issue of disputed fact in this case, and I will therefore grant the defendant's Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment and I will order that a Judgment of Dismissal be entered." 
(September 25, 2015 Hearing Tr. V.1 44.) There is no question, when viewing the facts in the 
light most favorable to Plaintiffs, that the district court erred when it weighed Dr. Khong's and 
Dr. Well's testimony in finding that no genuine issues of material fact existed. The district court 
is not allowed to weigh the evidence in ruling against the movant on a motion for summary 
judgment. The district court did just that and the decision should be reversed and remanded to 
the district court for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court committed two points of error during this case. First, the district court 
erred when it held that Mr. Wyman's melanoma was ascertainable and had caused harm more 
than two years prior to Mr. Wyman filing his Application when it relied solely on Defendants' 
expert, Dr. Wells when Dr. Khong's testimony contradicted Dr. Wells opinions. 
Second, the court erred when it gave no weight to Dr. Khong's testimony that Mr. 
Wyman's cancer was not ascertainable or had caused harm prior to the biopsy performed on 
1 As noted above, Dr. Khong is a board certified oncologist who has a clinical practice wherein 
he specializes in the treatment of breast cancer and melanoma. (R. pp. 169 lines 3-16, 170 lines 
24-25, 171 lines 1-6.) 
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August 31, 2012, the first time the cancer was diagnosable. Dr. Khong is a specialist in treating 
melanoma and his testimony is admissible. Therefore, the district court's action of giving no 
weight to Dr. Khong's testimony is not permissible. 
Due to the errors committed by the district court in granting Defendants' Renewed 
Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court should reverse the district court's ruling and remand 
this case for further proceedings. 
DATED May 1 ih, 2016. 
S( . Millard (ID# 770 ) 
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